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difference in the image in these two situations is, functionally, readily explained. In the first case, the completion of the process of recognition is dependent upon a sensuous presentation of a certain content. The act can not take place until the sensuously constituted stimulus is integrated. The actual face of the person whom one is trying to remember, or the actual articulation of the sought-for word, is requisite to the recognition. In the case of the concept, on the contrary, the cognitive process is carried out by an already organized response for which the sensuous integration of the image is unnecessary—or is necessary only if the concept is held by itself apart from the experience which it interprets, in which case the image is but the surrogate of the object. Between these two extremes lies the so-called process of perception, with the image in varying degrees, as the cognitive act is of the nature of sensuous recognition or of conceptual interpretation. I will discuss later the nature of the structure of the image, especially from the point of view of the Wundt-Stout concept of disposition.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Zur Ethik des Gesamtwillens. Eine socialphilosophische Untersuchung. RUDOLF GOLDSCHEID. Erster Band. Leipzig, O. R. Reisland, 1902. 552 pp.

The title of this rather bulky volume gives no very clear indication of its contents. Only the latter part of the book is concerned directly with the ethics of the collective will, but preliminary to this is a lengthy discussion of the relation between mind and body, and of the origin of the categorical imperative, followed by a polemic against the theistic view of the world with special reference to the alleged shortcomings of Protestant and Roman Catholic theology and the inconsistencies of the state church in Germany. The chapters directly referred to by the title contain an arraignment of modern political institutions, especially as found in Germany, and a plea for their modification in the direction of an international socialism.

Such unity as the book possesses is due to the author's philosophical system, which is based upon the 'empirocriticism' of Avenarius. It is an attempt to unite the Kantian theory of knowledge and ethics with the standpoint of materialistic evolution. The result reached is a monism of mind and body which is opposed alike to the dominant theory of parallelism and to that of interaction. The main argument against theology is that it is dualistic and does not accept the monistic theory of mind and body; while the parallelistic cleft between mind and body, it is

hinted, is responsible for that between theory and practice, and so underlies the inconsistencies of a statecraft which teaches altruism through an established church, and yet in war and commerce practices individualism.

The defense and exposition of the Avenarian theory will be more interesting to the philosophical reader than the somewhat remote applications made of it in the spheres of religion and politics. Ethics, it is held, must rest upon psychology, and psychology can only advance with the progress of its two members, physiology and theory of knowledge. If psychology is to be a science, it must trace the causes of mental activities, and it is not enough to resolve complex processes into their simpler elements; these in turn must be referred to their physiological conditions. The position is maintained that mental processes are immediately dependent in a one-sided way upon the central nervous system. To defend this view from the charge of materialism recourse is had to an idealistic theory of knowledge which declares that body and brain exist only as mental representations, the causes of which are, and must remain unknown. It then becomes necessary to harmonize the two apparently irreconcilable propositions that spirit is a product of nature and that nature is a product of our spirit, and only one way is open to an 'exact psychology,'—to conceive nature and spirit, or mind and body, as a unity. This conclusion is negatively supported by a critique of parallelism, which separates what is united in experience, and of interactionism, which occupies the standpoint of a pre-Kantian dualism and is in conflict with the law of the conservation of energy. The monistic view, it is further declared, is not metaphysical, but is based solely upon pure or immediate experience.

Objection may easily be made to this solution of the psychophysical problem, but it has dialectically much to commend it. A monism which can assert indifferently that mind is a product of matter, that matter is a product of mind, and that the two are one and the same, has the obvious advantage that if one part of the system be attacked its defender can retire to another. The author is enabled virtually to assert the mutual dependence of mind and body against the parallelists, and to deny it against the interactionists. Mind and body are two when the author wishes to show that the psychical can only be explained by the physical; they are one when he wishes to avoid the difficulties of parallelism and interaction. The outcome of this way of looking at the problem is a confusing *communicatio idiomatum,* an excuse for which is sought in the relativity of our knowledge (p. 31), but relativity should hardly be used to cover logical inconsistencies.

The difficulties of combining Kantian idealism with a materialistic psychology which asserts the complete dependence of mind upon brain, multiply as the argument proceeds. To say, in general, that a part of consciousness, the idea (*Vorstellung*) of the brain, is the seat of the whole is, the author admits, absurd (p. 39), and he appeals to the knowledge we have of our fellow men. But here again we are met with the absurdity equally apparent of saying that my idea of my fellow man's brain is the seat of his consciousness. If, however, we mean by brain in this case the cause of my idea, we are trespassing upon the forbidden ground of meta-

physics, for 'from the contents of an idea (*Vorstellung*) nothing can be concluded as to its cause' (p. 39). The author, of course, sees the difficulty here, but thinks that the two-fold progress of physiology and of theory of knowledge has placed us in a 'circle' from which, in the nature of the case, there can be no escape.

Doubt may be suggested as to whether the Avenarian theory of 'pure experience,' at least as expounded in the present volume, really remains upon the ground of 'pure experience.' The binding together of consciousness and brain activity, whether in the form of mutual dependence, of one-sided dependence, of mere concomitance or of identity, is at best only an inference—not a matter of 'immediate experience.' I have, as is admitted, no immediate experience of the peculiar molecular activities of my own brain which are associated with consciousness, nor, when appeal is made, as it is (p. 40), to my fellow man, have I any immediate experience of his consciousness—supposing his brain to be open to observation. Ruling out telepathy, which is not here in question, I can only infer consciousness from observed bodily movements. A certain relation between mind and brain may be legitimately inferred, but as soon as we assert this relation, we have already left the ground of 'immediate experience.' The author naturally finds it difficult to steer between the scepticism as to the mind-and-body problem which he deprecates (Chap. IV.) and the metaphysics which he condemns. He believes that his theory is a legitimate extension of Kantian principles, but Kant claimed it as an advantage of his system that the psychophysical problem which had so long troubled philosophy was at last shown to lie outside the limits of human knowledge.

In his treatment of ethical problems the author likewise attempts to unite the Kantian with the modern evolutionary standpoint, and here again his treatment is rather confusing. The categorical imperative is spoken of as a 'certainly demonstrable psychological fact,' but it is to be explained 'without mystical additions'; and some, if not all, the suggestions made as to its origin seem inconsistent with its peculiar character. When asked how the categorical imperative can evolve, the author gives several answers: (1) It is postulated with reference to the action of one's fellows. What I wish to be done, others, I feel, ought to do. (2) It arises when the necessity of means to ends is considered. I ought to do what will carry out my fixed purposes (p. 88). (3) What is subjectively intensely desired takes on the form of objective good—although it is admitted that men desire many things which possess not the slightest worth (pp. 96, 99). (4) Intellect is the best weapon in the struggle for existence, but developing intellect carries with it as a by-product, it is said, developing morality. Yet it is admitted that this development supplies only the formal conditions of morality. The possession of intellect gives the individual the capacity to act according to ends. "But morality is formally nothing else than action according to an appointed end" (p. 310). It is not clearly shown how the peculiar nature of the moral end can be the necessary result of a developing intelligence. (5) It is further suggested, in an interesting chapter on the 'double root of morality,' that the law of

altruism is imposed upon the governed in the interests of the ruling classes. Altruism is thus both the natural result in all men of a developing intellect and the artificial result in the governed of the overweening egoism of the rulers. Altruism is thus both independent of egoism and dependent upon it.

The author's mind is apparently divided between the desire to retain the Kantian moral imperative in his system and the desire to explain morality wholly in terms of pleasurable feeling. It seems doubtful whether the foundation for an 'exact ethics,' the possibility of which is discussed in a later chapter, has been laid.

Mr. Goldscheid shows a wide acquaintance with philosophical literature, and writes in a fluent style, often with needless repetition. The book contains brief but instructive criticisms of the systems of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and a short chapter on free-will, whose assumption in the individual, it is argued, would destroy the responsibility of the state. The evils of modern capitalism and militarism are dwelt upon at length in the closing chapters.

In at least fifteen different places the author promises to return to the question under discussion in a second volume, which has not yet been published. Among the points to be there elucidated are the relation of ethics to religion and of determinism to responsibility, the economic basis of the struggle for existence, the conditions of moral progress, the dangers of under-population, the practicability of an international parliament to regulate production, and the woman question. If this promise is fulfilled, it is to be feared that the second volume will not be free from a certain diffuseness and lack of unity of which the reader of the present volume has a right to complain.

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Morale et Biologie. D. PARODI. *Revue Philosophique,* August, 1904, pp. 113–135.

This brilliant and well-written article is a criticism of the modern tendency toward a biological conception of ethics which would make that discipline only the practical application to life of principles determined by the natural sciences, in particular, by the biological sciences. The ideal of life is taken as perfect adjustment of organism to environment, and the necessary conditions for its realization are made matters of scientific research. The whole problem of conduct is simplified by being reduced to terms of general hygiene. Of this general tendency the recent work by Metchnikoff, 'Études sur la nature humaine,' is taken by M. Parodi as a brilliant specimen and subjected to a searching criticism.

The subtitle of this book, *Un essai de philosophie optimiste,* indicates the attitude of the author. He is an optimist, however, not in the older sense of one for whom the world is the best possible, but in the characteristic modern meaning of one who recognizes everywhere the imperfections of life but sees in science the hope of their removal. These imperfections are of three classes, disease, old age, the fear of death, and all